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ABSTRACT: Citizenship has been widely debated in postwar British history, 
yet historians discuss the concept in very different, and potentially contradictory, 
ways.  In doing so, historians are largely following in the footsteps of postwar 
politicians, thinkers and ordinary people, who showed that citizenship could – 
and did – mean very different things.  The alternative ways of framing the 
concept can be usefully described as the three registers of citizenship. First, there 
are the political and legal definitions of what makes any individual a citizen. 
Secondly, there is the notion of belonging to a national community, an 
understanding of citizenship which highlights that legal status alone cannot 
guarantee an individual’s ability to practise citizenship rights. Thirdly, there is 
the idea of citizenship as divided between ‘good’ or ‘active’ citizens, and ‘bad’ 
or ‘passive’ ones, a differential understanding of citizenship which has proved 
very influential in debates about British society. This article reviews these 
registers, and concludes by arguing that all three must be taken into account if 
we are to properly comprehend the nature and citizenship as both status and 
practice in postwar Britain. 
 
Citizenship is one of the most important themes of postwar British history. Traditional 
narratives of the 1945-1979 ‘postwar’ period have emphasized the rise and fall of 
political consensus, the decline of British power amid decolonization and cold war, the 
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paradoxical nature of economic discourse which identified  relative economic decline 
on the one hand and growing affluence on the other, and the rise of what is sometimes 
crudely described as ‘identity politics’ (often used as a catch-all term to cover the 
discontents of those who felt excluded from mainstream political life: such as those 
affected by or involved in the social and political consequences of immigration, the rise 
of nationalism in Scotland and Wales, the Women’s Liberation Movement, and the 
‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland).1 The issue of citizenship is foundational to many of 
these narratives. ‘Citizenship’ has been used by historians to examine the role of the 
welfare state in people’s lives,2 popular engagement with politics,3 immigration and the 
experience of racism,4 and consumer identities.5 The legal framework of citizenship was 
also changing in postwar Britain. In 1945, votes for all those over twenty-one had been 
secured,6 but the creation of universal welfare rights not yet assured.7 As the decades 
wore on deep anxieties were felt about what citizenship would mean in a multi-racial 
nation.8 At the same time, political elites were keener than ever to see a rise in social 
and political participation.9 To put it simply, citizenship has been a key way of framing 
questions relating to the basic interactions between individuals and the state, and 
between individuals within society – but those interactions and relationships were 
changing in the postwar period, as was the value attributed to different articulations of 
citizenship.  The aim of this article is to map the often radically different ways 
historians and other scholars have understood citizenship in postwar Britain, and to 
suggest an outline for a synthetic approach to the topic which combines these different 
understandings to allow us to reconstruct its history, both as a category of historical 
analysis and as a concept that had real meaning and impact in Britain after the Second 
World War.   
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 What historians mean by citizenship varies widely. In a pioneering essay on 
gender and citizenship, the cultural historians Kathleen Canning and Sonya Rose called 
it ‘one of the most porous concepts in contemporary academic parlance’.10 Social 
scientists also take a wide-ranging approach to citizenship, with Andreas Fahremier 
arguing it ‘has come to mean anything and nothing’,11 and Ruth Lister noting it ‘runs 
the danger of meaning what people choose it to mean’.12 This confusion is particularly 
important in the context of postwar Britain: the relationship between the individual and 
state was undergoing massive change as a result of the new welfare state, and mass 
immigration challenged notions of who ‘belonged’.13 These were profound issues for 
contemporaries, who understood citizenship in a variety of ways, just as historians have. 
In postwar Britain, we can see that citizenship has been historicized within three broad 
registers. First, historians often see citizenship as a narrowly politico-legal framework, 
analysing the legal, political and social rights of the population, but also the obligations 
expected in return.  Secondly, historians see citizenship as resulting from ‘belonging’ to 
a constructed national community, and investigate both how belonging has been a key 
marker, or gateway, to citizenship status, and the ways in which concepts of national 
community have been constructed (not to mention the consequences for those deemed 
‘outside’ that community). Thirdly, historians have also focused on what we can call 
differentiated aspects of citizenship, particularly on the creation of ‘good citizens’ and 
on debates about how citizenship can be enhanced or improved, often with a particular 
emphasis on voluntary action or ‘engagement’.  
For citizenship to have any analytical meaning, however, and if historians are to 
be able to understand all its ramifications in historical context, there needs to be a 
definitional core which encompasses the different understandings of citizenship, 
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allowing the term to be used in a way that retains meaning rather than becoming 
unmanageably malleable. Fundamentally, citizenship is both a status and a practice.14 
People are born into, are awarded, or achieve citizenship status. This status must be 
understood as an amalgamation of all three registers: in legal terms in connection with 
formal state power (such as the possession of a passport or the right to claim benefits), 
social terms (such as the ability to participate within civil society in a number of ways), 
and finally cultural or ‘discursive’ terms (such as being deemed a citizen within popular 
culture, or understanding oneself as a citizen). Through their everyday interactions with 
state and society, people practise citizenship. They live out, or perform, citizenship in a 
variety of similar dimensions: legal (such as by voting), social (such as by 
volunteering), and cultural (by talking, or perhaps even just thinking, about citizenship). 
Status and practice are linked. Citizens can achieve, enhance, lose, or diminish their 
status through the practice of citizenship. Furthermore, how citizens understand 
themselves or their status is shaped by their interactions with other citizens, the state, 
and a whole panoply of institutions and organizations which make up political, social 
and cultural life in Britain: shaped, that is, as much by their own agency as by the 
political, social and cultural structures around them. 
The three ways historians have understood citizenship in postwar Britain may 
differ from each other, but all adhere to this definitional core. This is why it is useful to 
consider the main ways historians have approached the topic as different ‘registers’ 
rather than as competing or alternative conceptions.  The first three sections of this 
essay focus on how historians have investigated each of these different registers of 
citizenship, while the fourth and final section explores how we can usefully combine the 
three registers into a synthetic approach to the topic that adheres to the identified 
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definitional core, but does not leave behind any of the fundamental ways citizenship has 
been understood in its historical contexts. In particular, it will discuss the methodologies 
needed to further historical understandings of the topic at the elite level, within popular 
culture, and  in the realm of experience. The task for historians is to understand the vast 
range of activities, ideas, values and behaviours that made up ‘citizenship’, both as 
status and practice, in any given society at any given time. By placing historical and 
cultural specificity at the heart of any analysis of citizenship, we can gain new insight 
into how it was understood and experienced, made and remade, by people at different 
points, and how it changed over time.   
 
I 
The first register takes as its starting point the inclusion of sections of the population 
within ‘formal citizenship’, the politico-legal relationship between citizens and the state 
which enshrins both rights and obligations. For historians of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, this naturally leads to an emphasis on the extension of voting rights, 
as accession to full political rights is, within this register, the fundamental threshold of 
citizenship.15 Historiographical interest in ‘formal citizenship’ in the postwar era of 
mass democracy, however, has focused on two key areas: the concept of ‘social 
citizenship’, and the way immigrants, and particularly non-white ones, have been 
included or excluded as formal citizens. Both areas illustrate the continual importance 
of politico-legal frameworks to the understanding of citizenship, but also raise key 
issues about how citizenship is experienced and how ideas of citizenship change. They 
also raise different issues about the importance of obligations as opposed to rights in 
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notions of formal citizenship. Above all, it seems clear that formal citizenship alone is 
inadequate for understanding the history of citizenship in this period.  
  ‘Social citizenship’ has been integral to debates about British citizenship since 
1945.16 Central to the concept of social citizenship has been the theory T.H. Marshall 
expounded in a lecture in 1949, and in print in 1950.17 Marshall argued that in addition 
to legal and political rights, citizens were also entitled to ‘social rights’, especially 
access to welfare benefits. Marshall has been central to the history of citizenship 
thought, serving as a touchstone for discussions of ‘social citizenship’ more generally.18 
For historians, whether charting the history of the welfare state or the welfare reforms of 
the early twentieth century, social citizenship is a paradigm through which much 
welfare history has been written. As Jose Harris has argued, ‘the ethic of social 
citizenship as an automatic right was a “rhetorical hallmark” of the early welfare 
state’.19 Social citizenship has come more sharply into focus for social scientists with 
the undermining of universal provision in the years after 1979, with the curtailment of 
welfare rights seen as a diminution of citizenship.20  
 Although social citizenship is usually associated with social rights, Marshall 
himself argued that citizens received rights ‘conditional only on the discharge of the 
general duties of citizenship’.21 Those ‘general duties’ have served to undermine or 
limit social citizenship. As Lydia Morris has powerfully argued, the renewed emphasis 
on the unemployed to prove their rights to benefits throughout the 1980s and 1990s 
involved ‘a discouraging, demoralizing and humiliating procedure’, but was construed 
as ‘one of the duties of the citizen’.22 In this sense, the contingent nature of welfare 
provision echoed the bitter experience of the 1930s.23 To give another example, Abigail 
Wills’ work on delinquency has shown how the 1950s delinquent was deemed to have 
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‘failed in his obligations to an organic community which then had the right to “cast him 
out” symbolically, until he fulfilled the requirements that allowed him to return’.24 
Obligation was at the heart of William Beveridge’s social thought,25 and although his 
more contractarian, voluntarist vision of social insurance was rejected in favour of a 
more ‘rights’ based approach by the Attlee Government,26 it is clear that while the status 
of social citizenship might officially be enshrined by law, it is always reliant to some 
extent on dynamic and changeable citizenship practice. So in order to understand social 
citizenship historically, we must go beyond the legal framework of welfare rights, and 
focus on changing practices and assumptions that determined whether citizens could 
actually access their rights.  
The second focus of academic work on ‘formal citizenship’ has been 
immigration and race.27 Some of the most vibrant and vital work on the issue of 
citizenship has tackled how non-white people in Britain and the Empire were included 
or excluded as ‘British’ citizens in the legal sense through the implementation of a 
range of legislation from the 1948 British Nationality Act to the 1981 Act which shared 
the same name, although not the same aims. Such work is crucial for understanding the 
impact of legislation on citizenship, as political imperatives could serve to strip rights 
away from groups of citizens.28 The key piece of legislation in this context was the 
Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962, which reduced the right of entry to the 
United Kingdom of those granted legal citizenship by the 1948 Act. There is broad 
historiographical consensus that underpinning the restrictions to entry in the 1962 Act 
was the belief that ‘colonial’ citizens, guaranteed formal citizenship and concomitant 
rights of access to Britain in 1948, did not really ‘belong’, or were not ‘really British’. 
There is disagreement as to why this belief existed. Kathleen Paul has argued that the 
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government’s own rhetoric, inspired by a racist desire to limit immigration, sparked 
popular racism.29 Chris Waters’ classic article argued for deeper-seated cultural 
attitudes based on racial difference.30 Work by James Hampshire and Raieko Karatani 
focuses closely on the Acts themselves as the pillars of formal citizenship.31 However, 
once the causes of the Acts are examined, a more fluid conception of citizenship 
emerges, illustrating that although non-white people may have had the status of formal 
citizens, they were not treated as such, politically or socially.  
This difference between the status and practice of citizenship is of crucial 
importance. Hampshire spends much of his book discussing the differences between 
‘belonging’ and ‘non-belonging’ citizens, but argues that citizenship was ‘a legal status 
not a substantive ideal’ and rejects the idea that ‘citizenship simply is full membership 
of a community, which entails a full sense of belonging by self and others’.32 This 
narrow definition of citizenship does not correlate to how ‘citizen’ and ‘citizenship’ 
were used, understood and experienced in postwar Britain, nor does it reflect the 
importance of citizenship practice. It is clear that many white people did not consider 
Black people to be citizens of equal status in this period.33 The rise of Powellism in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s illustrated that such attitudes towards non-white people were 
widespread, underpinned by assumptions about whiteness, belonging, order and 
disorder, and a basic sense of who ‘deserved’ to have access to the nation’s resources.34 
Such attitudes resulted in direct discrimination throughout the postwar period, 
restricting access to the basic necessities of life such as housing and employment. This 
discrimination was actively resisted by Black Britons who articulated their own sense of 
citizenship in opposition to anti-Black racism, challenging the state, in Kennetta Perry’s 
words, ‘to acknowledge and guarantee their rights as British citizens’.35 The history of 
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racial discrimination, and the fight against it, highlights that formal citizenship – the 
possession of a British passport and political rights – did not in itself define what 
citizenship was or who was a citizen in postwar Britain.  
The complex relationship between ‘formal’ citizenship and the ability to practise 
citizenship is also visible in the history of Northern Ireland. The actions of both the 
Stormont Government and local authorities throughout the province in the fields of 
local political representation and above all in housing amounted to a denial of 
citizenship to large parts of the Catholic population in the postwar period, whatever the 
formal status of individuals. As Richard Bourke has described, Harold Wilson was fully 
aware of the problems faced by Northern Irish Catholics before the election of the 1964 
Labour Government, although he proved relatively powerless to deliver change.36 
Eradicating such basic injustices in a peaceful way was the key aim of the Civil Rights 
Association, formed in 1967, one of a number of initiatives to ‘normalize’ politics and 
civil society in Northern Ireland.37  
Both social citizenship and the racialized or sectarian nature of citizenship 
practice demonstrate the difficulty in keeping citizenship within narrow legal 
boundaries. Whatever the legal status was, it rested on practices which were constantly 
changing and historically specific. As Michael Freeden puts it: ‘citizenship was not just 
a recognition of one’s formal standing in the community…. It was also the expression 
of an active, demand-generating, and socially constructive populace, embodying a 
dynamic cluster of social interactions within the domain of both state and civil 
society’.38 Narrow definitions of citizenship as a legal status miss this dynamic 
remaking of citizenship, providing a partial picture of what it means and neglecting both 
individuals’ understanding of themselves and others as citizens, and political, social and 
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cultural assumptions about the role of citizens and how they should behave. In order to 
successfully historicize citizenship, we need to tackle the issues raised by formal 
citizenship relating to obligations, the relationship between formal citizenship and the 
‘demand-generating’ populace, and how this relationship changed over time.  
 
II 
The second register of citizenship used by historians, focusing on citizenship as a wider 
process of inclusion and exclusion in a ‘national community’, addresses some of these 
issues raised by formal citizenship. Citizenship on the formal level, as we have seen, 
necessitated an understanding, or at least an assumption, about who ‘belonged’ or who 
‘deserved’ to be included within any regime of citizenship rights. Historians who have 
understood citizenship as a much broader category of inclusion and exclusion can be 
said to be searching for the cultural underpinnings of these understandings or 
assumptions of belonging.  In defining citizens as those belonging to a national 
community, exclusion is as much a category of analysis as inclusion. Historians have 
long seen ‘national identity’ as being defined against the values and characteristics of 
those ‘others’ outside the nation.39 Citizenship has been seen as defined in a similar 
way: created positively in terms of the values possessed by citizens, but also negatively 
in terms of certain characteristics, values and behaviour not possessed.40 Possession of 
supposedly ‘negative’ qualities, or even the lack of certain supposedly ‘positive’ 
qualities, can lead to stigmatization as a ‘bad citizen’, and exclusion from the 
constructed national community of citizens.  
The idea that citizenship resides in a ‘national community’ was a central feature 
of T.H. Marshall’s theory,41 but one open to the criticism that such a ‘national 
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community’, defined by a ‘shared civilization’, was untenable once the nature of British 
society began to change through the process of mass immigration. Historians who use 
this broad register of citizenship can be said to be subverting  Marshall’s central 
precept: whereas he saw the national community as inclusive, some historians see it 
rather as something which excludes precisely because some groups and individuals are 
stigmatized as not belonging to the ‘national community’. This view of citizenship 
discourse as exclusionary arises out of the approaches and techniques of cultural 
history, and particularly on belief in the cultural construction of identities through the 
play and interplay of discourse. Citizenship becomes fluid in this formation, defined and 
redefined in different contexts and excluding different groups at different times.  Two 
exemplary practitioners of this approach are Nicoletta Gullace and Sonya Rose, authors 
respectively of books on citizenship in the First and Second World Wars. Gullace 
examines how the ‘cultural environment created by the war reconfigured the way 
Britons understood the rights and obligations of citizenship’, and in particular how this 
environment led to the changes in the suffrage enshrined in the 1918 Representation of 
the People Act (the enfranchisement of women over thirty, but also servicemen under 
twenty-one and the temporary disenfranchisement of conscientious objectors).42 
Similarly, Rose sees citizenship as ‘a discursive framework explicating the judicial 
relationship between the people and the political community’, which defines ‘who does 
and does not belong to a particular (national) community’ and therefore is ‘a synonym 
for nationality, but one that is formally linked to the notion of rights that accrue to 
members, and to the obligations that citizens owe the state in return’.43  
Central to Rose’s argument is that during the war years ‘good citizenship’, seen 
as ‘voluntary fulfilment of obligations and willingness to contribute to the welfare of the 
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community’,44 became elevated through political rhetoric and propaganda to the point 
where those who were not ‘good citizens’ were seen as failing to contribute to the war 
effort. Within popular culture, ‘good citizenship’ was promoted partly through positive 
stories praising heroism and self-sacrifice, but also partly through identifying and 
stigmatizing the behaviour of ‘bad citizens’. Labelling ‘bad citizens’ served not only to 
inspire renewed ‘good citizenship’, but to recalibrate perceived ‘normal’ behaviour as 
the everyday actions of good citizens.45 This is a productive way of thinking about how 
citizenship is constructed, as is Rose’s insistence on the importance of moral discourse 
in the labelling of bad citizens, which highlights the key difference between citizenship-
as-belonging and national identity.46 Although closely linked, citizenship in this register 
is different from national identity because it is as much about people being excluded for 
their perceived behaviour as it is their ‘ethnic’ or ‘national’ characteristics. 
After 1945, it is clear that citizenship was indeed considered by many to consist 
of ‘belonging’ to a national community from which certain people or communities were 
excluded.47 Here we can return to James Hampshire’s rejection of T.H. Marshall’s idea 
of the national community as a definition of citizenship. His own work lucidly shows 
how non-white immigrants were considered as ‘not belonging’, with important 
consequences for those communities and individuals.48 Likewise, Kathleen Paul has 
argued that in the age of mass immigration ‘formal definitions of citizenship 
increasingly have had less influence than racialized images of national identity’.49 
Whatever the legal status of non-white people in Britain during the 1960s and 1970s, 
the racism many experienced was underpinned by a widespread assumption among the 
white population that Black Britons were not ‘in’ the national community, making a 
mockery of the argument that they held citizenship in the fullest sense of the word. 
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Again, in their attempt to counteract racist discourses which sought to exclude them 
from a racialized national community, Black British activists articulated a vision of 
citizenship which explicitly linked belonging and citizenship.50 In short, people 
understood citizenship broadly, and as a category which achieved meaning through the 
inclusion of some and the exclusion of others.  
Exclusion was central to the discursive framework of citizenship, but it had 
important consequences beyond discourse. Although people excluded in this way still 
formally had the same rights as anyone else, attacks on ‘belonging’ did have direct 
consequences, as the history of racism in Britain shows. Likewise, changing 
assumptions about the nature of rights and obligations underpinned ‘real’ assaults on 
rights. Once we accept that duties and obligations change over time, and that state 
policy is not created in a vacuum but is rooted in these changing cultural assumptions, 
the question of how exclusion occurs becomes central to how we historicize citizenship. 
For Rose, the key to inclusion and exclusion was how ‘ordinary people’ made sense of, 
and operated within, the Gramscian ‘hegemonic discourse’ of citizenship which 
permeated popular culture during the war.51 In particular, her argument rests on 
examining citizenship as a form of subjectivity.52 Michael Roper has taken issue with 
such ambitious claims about subjectivity and citizenship, claiming that in arguing for 
‘citizenship as a subjectivity’, Rose and Canning ‘collapse distinctions which are surely 
important to maintain between actual citizens, and the laws, rhetorics and practices to 
which those citizens are subject’.53 The relationship between citizenship discourse and 
experience is immensely important, but historians must emphasize agency as well as the 
‘governmental’ nature of citizenship.54 We must bear in mind that historical citizens 
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were not blank subjects acting out linguistic codes, but were engaged in establishing 
different modes of citizenship within the discursive structures around them.  
To fully understand citizenship within the context of postwar Britain we need to 
comprehend how it was constructed and circulated within popular culture. Individuals 
were affected by a citizenship discourse which could be subject to intense government 
intervention,55 but we also need to answer the question of how apparently ‘bad’ citizens 
understood citizenship or their own place within the supposedly ‘hegemonic’ 
narrative.56 For example, cold war tensions led to the stigmatizing of Communists in 
Britain as archetypal bad citizens, attacked throughout society, from the civil service to 
the trade unions, and even the Boy Scout movement, as inherently disloyal and 
dangerous.57 Yet Communists themselves not only rejected the attempts to portray them 
as such, but also understood their own political activity as a radical form of citizenship 
– one devoted to the building of socialism in Britain.58  
The gap between labelling and the experience and agency of people labelled 
seems difficult to bridge: certainly we need to bear in mind that citizens, as individuals 
or in groups, practised citizenship in their own way, within or indeed against existing 
cultural scripts, and in doing so could contribute to wider rhetorics and perhaps even 
laws. Any analysis of citizenship must be rooted in experience and social relationships. 
Discourse is clearly important, but we need to understand its relationship with 
experience and agency as a two-way street. We need to probe processes of inclusion and 
exclusion further, and this can only be done by researching how ideas and experiences 
of citizenship shaped people’s lives, whether directly or indirectly. This is not the same 
as understanding people’s ‘subjectivities’, although it does involve accessing individual 
reactions to and understandings of citizenship. This not a minor issue. The emphasis on 
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subjectivities suggests historians can discover what people really felt or thought about 
an issue. Searching for people’s interactions with citizenship ideas, and how they 
practised citizenship, relies on something more knowable – how people articulated 
citizenship and practised it in relation to the state and their fellow citizens. Once we can 
grasp this, we can map the relationships between discourse and experience, the 
processes by which people were included in or excluded from the ‘national community’, 
and the ways they claimed their own, different relations to it. 
 
III 
The third and final register is the emphasis on the differential quality of citizenship, and 
in particular what is often called ‘active’ or ‘good’ citizenship. Active citizenship is a 
traditional way of understanding citizenship (the ‘republican’ model). It is argued that 
active citizenship improves society and political discourse, and is of enormous benefit 
for both the individual and the wider polity and society.59 As such it is opposed to 
‘passive’ citizenship, the enjoyment of citizenship rights without undertaking the work 
of citizenship.60 The ‘active’ and ‘passive’ divide in citizenship has deep roots within 
British social discourse,61 but has been increasingly politicized by both left and right 
since the 1980s, with the promotion of active citizenship a rhetorical marker for every 
government since Thatcher’s.62 It also the central plank of ‘Citizenship Studies’, a 
subject taught to schoolchildren in the United Kingdom.63 Historical attention, however, 
has so far focused on the extent to which such active citizenship existed, and how it was 
promoted. It has, to date, been less concerned with how it was experienced and the 
wider consequences of promoting a differentiated conception of citizenship.64 One 
reason for this is the fact that much of the writing on this topic is less concerned with 
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the history of citizenship per se than with voluntary action. As volunteers are by nature 
‘active’, it is unsurprising that the literature has more to say on ‘active’ citizenship than 
its supposed alternative, ‘passive’ citizenship. 
This is not to criticize such scholarship, which has gone a long way to correct 
long-held assumptions about the decline of participation, the paucity of voluntarism, 
and the basic aims and thought of many of the pioneers of the welfare state. Geoffrey 
Finlayson’s pioneering work detailed the persistence of the voluntary sector in 
providing welfare services within the context of the postwar welfare state, dismissing 
lazy arguments that state welfare had strangled voluntary action.65 Further research has 
emphasized the vibrancy of a range of organizations throughout the postwar period, and 
a general picture has emerged from such detailed research of a voluntary or NGO sector 
acting, not only in opposition to the state, but as part of a mixed welfare economy. 66 
These groups, recruiting active citizens to run and support them, were also interested in 
educating or training ‘good’ citizens as part of a wider desire to transform society.67 
Often, such activities were explicit attempts to improve or defend the citizenship rights 
of certain people. Peter Shapely has argued that the emergence of local tenants’ groups 
in the 1960s was directly linked to an assumption of increased rights in the period of the 
welfare state.68 Organizations like Gingerbread or One Parent Families, on the other 
hand, fought the attempted stigmatization of single mothers as ‘archetypal welfare 
scroungers’ in the 1980s and 1990s.69 As the introduction to a recent edited collection 
put it, far from retreating from some sort of ‘golden age’ the voluntary sector 
‘constantly reinvented and redefined itself in response to social and political change’ 
throughout the postwar period.70  
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In terms of citizenship, however, this emphasis on voluntary action raises a 
crucial issue concerning the perceived worth of volunteering, active citizens: namely, 
are they ‘better’ citizens than the ‘passive’ ones who do not volunteer? Recent 
scholarship has decisively shown that such an assumption was prevalent throughout 
social thought after 1945. For example, there has been a new emphasis placed on the 
role of voluntarism in the thought of William Beveridge, who firmly believed that it 
improved both society and the individual, perhaps unsurprisingly given his training in 
social investigation during the early part of the century.71 In essence, the tenor of this 
work reflects the fact that for many in the postwar period and before, citizenship was 
understood as the practice of participation, altruism, and of course voluntarism, and a 
key social aim was to enhance citizenship in this sense throughout the country at large.72  
The desire to increase ‘good’ citizenship was partly driven by a general tendency 
to assume that the British public was increasingly apathetic after 1945, to the detriment 
of the overall quality of political life. David Marquand’s trenchant Decline of the public 
argued that the public’s ability and willingness to participate in politics has declined 
from a mid-century heyday.,73 Likewise, the landmark, but controversial, co-written 
book England arise! argued that the Attlee Government’s attempt to ‘transform people 
from private individuals into active citizens’ was stymied by the mass apathy of the 
population, most of whom ‘remained preoccupied with their private spheres and 
rejected institutions to make them community-spirited’.74 More recently, the increase in 
research on ‘political culture’ has led to a rethinking of what is meant by political 
participation. Lawrence Black has argued that political culture became more dispersed 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s, with the ‘decline’ of traditional party-based political 
activity compensated by alternative forms of political engagement.75 A related argument 
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is cogently made by Matthew Hilton, that the rise of NGOs and the struggles of 
traditional political parties amounted to a transformation of the political after 1945, not 
a decline in political participation through ‘opting-out’.76  
Two major interlinked questions are often left unanswered by this emphasis on 
the differentiated quality of citizenship. The first is the whole question of agency. How 
did people interact with, and influence, citizenship? The second is to do with apparently 
‘passive’ citizens. There is an often unwritten elision between ‘active’ citizenship and 
‘good’ citizenship, based on the assumption that ‘active’ citizens are ‘better’ than 
‘passive’ ones, with ‘passive’ citizens crowded out of the historical record. Agency is 
crucial to active citizenship: it is, after all, a theory based on individual and collective 
participation. It is also often presented in socially progressive terms, but the agency of 
‘active’ citizens can also be aimed at resisting social change, whether through 
entrenching the privilege of those with economic or social power within organizations,77 
or through a large range of socially conservative groups which are as a much a part of 
the voluntary sector as so-called ‘new social movements’.78 The issue of passivity is 
closely linked to the question of agency. Ruth Lister argued that acting as a citizen 
‘involves fulfilling the full potential of the status’, but those ‘who do not fulfil that 
potential do not cease to be citizens; moreover, in practice participation tends to be 
more of a continuum than an all or nothing affair and people might participate more or 
less at different points on the life-course’.79 What about those who do not participate? 
Lister and other theorists have been primarily interested in non-participation in terms of 
exclusion, of the inability to participate. The class basis of voluntarism, and the 
exclusionary nature of the whole ethos of ‘good citizenship’, is curiously neglected by 
historians.  
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Passivity is usually viewed as a negative quality, seen to have increased with 
affluence and the growth of more home-based and family-oriented modes of leisure. 
However, it could be argued that this view of ‘passivity’ adheres to a contractarian 
concept of citizenship. Individuals who fulfilled what could be considered to be their 
social roles and basic legal responsibilities – as mothers, workers, consumers, tax 
payers, and law-abiders – could be said to be ‘good citizens’ despite their lack of 
‘activism’. It is certainly doubtful that they would have considered themselves to be 
anything less. Not enough is known about ideas of citizenship at the level of how 
ordinary people understood their own obligations to state and society, of what 
citizenship meant at the level of the family. Certainly there were fears within the 
political class about the passivity of consumers,80 and activism in this area often 
concentrated on educating such passive citizens, but the history of consumer groups 
shows how citizenship discourse could, and did, reach into the home.81 Understanding 
the citizenship of the apparently passive, however, remains an important, although 
complex, task. Analyses of differentiated citizenship naturally equated ‘active’ citizens 
with ‘good’ citizens, with the obvious value judgement that those who were less ‘active’ 
somehow failed in some way. By understanding apparent ‘passivity’ in terms of agency, 
of people’s understanding and choices about citizenship, we can grasp the changes to 
ideas of citizenship in post-1945 Britain in a more nuanced way. Doing this, and 
according historical respect to people’s own conception of their relationship to state and 
society, might disrupt the tendency to criticize those who were or are less likely to 
participate in the sorts of activities given undue prominence within current, and 
historical, citizenship debates. 
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IV 
None of the registers discussed above is ‘incorrect’. Each seeks to answer valid 
questions, and to tackle aspects of citizenship which are of fundamental importance in 
the post-1945 British context. To fully understand citizenship in its historical context 
needs a synthetic approach that takes account of all three registers, understanding that 
they co-exist and overlap rather than compete, and that each fits into the definitional 
core outlined in the introduction. Using this definitional core as a starting point, 
however, historians can attempt to understand how citizenship was understood in 
postwar Britain, analysing how people conceptualized and articulated their 
understanding of their own relationship to the state and wider society, their own 
citizenship status and practice.  
One reason for the existence of these differing registers is that competing 
definitions and understandings were able to jostle against each other and operate in the 
same space without direct conflict. For example, there was a relative lack of theoretical 
discussion of citizenship at the level of elite political culture. As Edmund Neill has 
stated, ‘in the immediate postwar decades… in general, politicians and intellectuals 
largely eschewed the term’. The ‘perceived unity and homogeneity of British society’ 
after the Second World War and the existence of full employment and the welfare state 
combined to create a sense that the basic problems of citizenship had been dealt with.82 
As David Marquand put it, for many intellectuals after 1950 it was ‘self-evident’ that 
‘political rights and social citizenship were secure’.83 Yet this may be explained by the 
fact that such intellectuals had a narrow view of what citizenship was. Beyond the 
bounds of the register of formal political and social rights, this period saw wide and 
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varied discussion about citizenship. In addition to the already noted debates about race 
and voluntarism, there were discussions within the left concerning the need to improve 
‘political education’, a synonym for the sort of engaged citizenship which was such a 
concern within political thought in the 1920s and 1930s.84 Comprehensivization in 
secondary education was also a debate loaded with assumptions about the role of 
schooling in creating a politically informed and empowered citizenry,85 although its 
introduction was much more bipartisan and piecemeal than often thought.86 Several 
historians have noted the tradition of alternative models of political citizenship 
articulated within the non-Labour radical left, from Raphael Samuel’s discussion of the 
unique culture of citizenship within the Communist Party of Great Britain onwards. The 
New Left’s earnest discussions at the end of the 1950s about the ‘commitment’ of 
intellectuals was at its heart a debate about what a ‘citizen’ should be.87 Likewise, Celia 
Hughes has shown the complex ways young people on the radical left understood their 
citizenship as they participated in different activist groups designed to improve Britain 
and the wider world.88     
Engagement with the formal register of citizenship was resurgent in the 1980s 
and 1990s, when the underpinnings of the postwar settlement (such as full employment) 
had been lost and social citizenship came under attack. There was an explosion of 
writing about the Thatcherite onslaught on the rights of citizens and the articulation of 
an alternative model of citizenship based on the ‘Victorian’ value of self-reliance. 
Similarly, the left wished to reinforce and renew political and social citizenship, with a 
particular focus on both the need for citizenship education and the awareness that 
British citizenship was far from the inclusive category it had been assumed to be.89 The 
work of social theorists from the 1980s and 1990s has greatly enhanced our 
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understanding of how citizenship operates as both status and practice, and of how 
citizenship discourse operates beyond normative political theory. It has seen citizenship 
become defined more widely, encompassing, as Bernard Crick has put it, ‘significantly 
different meanings’ but also no ‘“essential” or universally true meaning’.90 
Historicizing citizenship, however, requires an acceptance that it is not so much 
a category of analysis as a concept with historically and culturally specific meanings. As 
such, as the introduction to this article suggests, it requires a definitional core, one that 
encompasses the enormously varied uses of the term. A criticism of such an approach 
might be that it risks imposing a definition on the past, labelling something as 
‘citizenship’ that was not understood as such. But tracing the history of words is not the 
same as understanding the history of ideas or concepts. As the three registers discussed 
above show, ‘citizenship’ was a term that signified different things for different people 
in postwar Britain, and is still a term which signifies different things for different 
historians. What these registers have in common is a shared basis in setting out the 
individual’s relationship with the state and with others in society, whether that be in 
legal, social or cultural terms. As Thomas Dixon has explained, such ‘concept history’ 
needs to chart synonyms, near-synonyms, and other terms used which allow us to 
understand contemporary understandings of the concept.91  
For citizenship to be successfully historicized in this way, close attention has to 
be paid to historical specificity. Citizenship clearly did not mean the same for people in 
1990, say, as it did in 1945. This change can be seen across all three registers, and 
addressing how and why concepts of citizenship changed will allow us to tackle 
questions of fundamental importance in Britain’s recent past, from the enormous 
changes enshrined in, and arising from, the postwar political settlement, to the complex 
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attitudes individuals had towards society. Accounting for such changes gets to the heart 
of the methodological task confronting any attempt to historicize citizenship: the 
relationship between discourse and experience. As has been seen, the operation of 
citizenship discourse within popular culture is crucial to how individuals formed their 
own ideas of citizenship, and how they acted on them. Yet we must break from the idea 
that symbolic representations determined experiences. Bill Schwarz has stressed that 
Powell’s ‘rivers of blood’ speech ‘marked the creation of a charged circuit of political 
rhetoric’, but obviously did not create the ideas concerning race which erupted from his 
supporters in the aftermath of the speech. They existed previously, in ‘the informalities 
of gossip or chat’ deeply rooted in ideas of nation and race with long antecedents. 
Powell may have created the political space in which they could be articulated, the 
furore over his speech may have allowed the transition from the ‘unspeakable to the 
speakable’, but it did not – and could not – create the fears, concerns, and ideas which 
made up popular racism in 1960s Britain.92  These were embedded in the memory of 
empire and war, but also in myriad economic and social anxieties. Citizenship 
discourse, the ideas circulating within popular culture, whether received from those with 
political or expert authority, or emerging from an incipient moral panic, is important. 
But individuals formed their own conceptions of citizenship within this discourse 
through their own lived experience and interactions with state and society, which co-
existed with assumptions about the proper nature of citizenship deriving from the legacy 
of the Second World War and earlier. The meaning and content of citizenship existed 
within the symbolic frame of discourse, which limited but did not determine citizenship 
experience. Discourse is also dynamic and subject to change through social and political 
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action: by the very practice of citizenship. People remained agents, and citizens were 
able to define their own concepts and practices of citizenship.  
To research citizenship in this way requires a rich seam of source material. 
There is a mass of popular cultural forms, the vast pile of books, newspapers, 
magazines, films, television shows and radio programmes, which constituted the 
‘circuit’ of ideas about citizenship. The administrative files, minutes, rule books, 
records of recruitment drives, of a vast array of voluntary groups, trade unions, schools, 
Women’s Institute branches, and working men’s clubs can tell us about the social world 
of citizenship: the spaces in which ideas and practices were formed and influenced. 
There are letters, diaries, and oral history transcripts in which people explain how they 
interacted with state and society, their values and their opinions on other citizens. From 
this mass of sources it will be possible to chart citizenship across its three registers, 
including press and parliament, committee room and protest march, and the home. Such 
an approach will allow us to account for the swirl of different ideas about citizenship as 
a status, and the different social experiences of it as a practice. It will allow us to 
acknowledge the structuring effects of discourse while emphasizing change and agency. 
In short, it will allow us to study what citizenship was.  
 Historicizing citizenship in postwar Britain, then, is a complex proposition. We 
must take as our starting point a definitional core of citizenship. From here, however, 
we must seek how citizenship was represented and experienced within its specific 
historical contexts. Normative theories, though useful for conceptualizing citizenship, 
must not crowd out actual historical understandings of citizenship. Approaching the 
topic in this way makes clear how embedded the three registers of citizenship were 
within political discussion, popular culture, and the social experience of the people. 
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British citizenship after 1945 cannot be contained in one of these areas; it spilled over 
into all three. Researching how people used those three registers will naturally bring to 
the fore questions of change and agency, providing us with a better understanding of 
citizenship in this period. The relationship people had with the state, the hazy realm of 
assumptions and expectations about politics, underpinned both the postwar settlement 
and its unravelling. The belief in individuals shaping society through action drove the 
rise of the voluntary sector but also the Women’s Liberation Movement.93 The belief 
that people could be excluded for reasons of behaviour or for belonging to certain 
sections of the community drove racism and helped entrench positions of cultural, social 
and economic privilege. We need a new history of citizenship – for within it is the 
history of modern Britain. 
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